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Introduction

In the early stages of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement, the most common expectation regarding the effect ADR
would have on the courts was twofold: It would relieve court
congestion and delay, and it would increase public satisfaction with
the justice system, by diverting cases that did not require the formal

* Rains Distinguished Professor of Alternative Dispute Resolution Law, Hofstra
Law School. B.A. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1974, Stanford Law School. This
Article began as a presentation at the mini-workshop on ADR organized by a
committee chaired by Dean Nancy Rogers at the 1996 American Association of Law
Schools Conference. The author thanks Dean Rogers and the program committee for

their invitation to participate in that program.
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legal process into more suitable, informal fora. 1 In other words, the
expectation was not that the use of ADR would lead to changes in
legal or courtroom procedures themselves, but that it would enable
courts to conduct legal procedures with less pressure, delay, and
congestion, and give parties someplace else to go when legal
procedures were not necessary or useful. ADR, in this view, was
not going to change the nature of what went on in court, but rather
support the court system by reducing its caseload burden.
In fact, over the past few decades, ADR, the supporting player,
has begun to effect the court system, the star player, in some very
significant ways. And, it is quite possible that the influence of ADR
on the legal system will grow even stronger in the future. Some
regard this as a desirable prospect, others as a danger. One way of
stimulating discussion-and preparing to deal with the policy
questions raised by this phenomenon-is to engage in an imaginative
exercise, envisioning what the legal system might look like in the
future, if the use of ADR continues to broaden and to influence the
courts.
This Article imagines a number of different visions-some
related and some mutually exclusive-of what the future might look
like, given continued influence of ADR utilization on the courts
themselves. 2 Each of these visions, or scenarios, is premised on the
continuation of developments that are already occurring in the ADR
field or related sectors. In this sense, each is a realistic future.
Laying out these alternative pictures of the possible future enables
1. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, Address at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 93
(1976) (stating that the time has come for a new concept that would "resolve minor
disputes more fairly and more swiftly than any present judicial mechanisms make
possible"); Robert F. Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planningand Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REv. 253,269 (1985) (endorsing various methods of ADR each of which
"assist in the resolution of a case short of a full trial on the merits"). See generally
Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
2. The futures pictured in this Article describe possibilities of what the court
system might look like in the decades to come, given the influence of ADR. They do
not address the possible shape of the ADR field itself, or other social institutions
related to the courts and ADR. In other words, broader visions of the future, visions
related to the developments described here, might be imagined as well, but these
broader visions are beyond the scope of this Article.
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us to consider and discuss which of the pictures we want to see
become a reality-and which we want to avoid.
In this Article, I largely refrain from offering conclusions about
the desirability of the different pictures presented; I try instead to
note some of the potential benefits and risks implicit in each picture,
leaving conclusions to the reader. However, the other contributors
to this Symposium Issue do offer some judgments on particular
developments, and the conclusion to this Article offers a few
observations on some of their comments. As noted above, the
scenarios described in this Article are not all mutually exclusive;
some could fit together as parts of a single vision of the future.
However, it is useful to view them separately. Since each one
stresses particular aspects of possible future development, presenting
them independently helps focus attention on each development in its
own right.

II.

Scenario I: The Courts Become Expert "ADR Managers"

Two decades ago, in 1976, Frank Sander suggested the idea of
courts serving as screeners or gatekeepers for a broader dispute
resolution system that encompassed various kinds of ADR processes.3 The idea of channelling certain types of cases out of courts
and into different kinds of ADR processes, according to some
rational sorting or diversion criteria, is one that has persisted and
grown in popularity over the years.4 Indeed, this idea has been

3. Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 130-31 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and
Achieving the Goals of Civil Justice:JurisdictionalPrinciplesforProcessChoice, 1984
WIs. L. REv. 893, 896-97 (suggesting the integration of several criteria to assist
courts in choosing the appropriate forum); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., ADR Problems
and Prospects:Looking to the Future, 69 JUDICATURE 291, 296 (1986) (discussing a
Dispute Resolution Center to refer disputants to an appropriate forum); Frank E.A.
Sander, Alternative Methods ofDispute Resolution:An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (1985) (exploring the model of a Dispute Resolution Center, or multi-door
courthouse); AD Hoc PANEL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PUB. POLICY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE

RESOLUTION 23 (1984) (suggesting that "a centralized system be established to screen
complaints and refer them to appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms").
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adopted in various forms, including statutes and court rules mandating ADR for certain types of cases and multi-door courthouse
projects that screen cases and refer disputants to ADR.5 In all of
these, some sort of analysis is made, at some level, that underlies
the decision to refer a certain type of case to a particular ADR
process.
In effect, what has already begun to happen is that courts
themselves have become managers of a larger dispute resolution
system that includes both the courts and ADR processes. Courts
allocate some of their resources to deciding which cases belong in
which process and implementing the decisions made. This represents one significant way that ADR has affected the courts: It has
expanded the courts' involvement in caseload management functions
to a new level, beyond managing and scheduling the courts' own
resources.
One can envision this involvement of courts in "process
management" functions increasing in the future. Judges and court
administrators might become increasingly proficient at screening
cases and matching them to appropriate ADR processes. Courts
might become even more sophisticated, not simply channelling
certain types of cases into ADR, but breaking cases up into pieces
and directing different pieces into different processes-some issues
into mediation, some into arbitration, some remaining in court. That
is, the courts might move toward providing a coordinated treatment
plan for each type of case (or each case) by utilizing multiple
processes, much like a health care organization identifying appropriate treatment options for different conditions. The use by some
courts of summary jury trials and settlement conferences as part of
the litigation process already suggests this kind of multi-level
treatment.
Alternatively, courts might use their administrative power to
encourage the parties to develop these kinds of dispute resolution
treatment plans, subject to court approval. In his article in this
Symposium Issue, Chief Justice Moon describes how this kind of

5. See Sander, supra note 458, at 12 (discussing the multi-door courthouse
concept and the pilot phase of the project).
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mechanism is presently under consideration in Hawaii, and how
other states have already moved in its direction.6
In this vision of the future, courts become more involved with
ADR management, devoting more of their resources to this task and
developing greater expertise. This development might parallel what
some have described as a trend toward managerial judging, with
judges increasingly involved in managing the flow of cases through
the litigation process rather than solely conducting judicial hearings.7 In Scenario I, judges and court personnel would become
process managers, directing the flow of whole groups of cases to and
through different dispute resolution processes.
If this first scenario unfolds and courts move increasingly
toward the expert-process-manager role, there could be great benefits
to both the courts and the public, as dispute resolution resources are
both expanded and used more rationally and efficiently. On the
other hand, adoption of the managerial role might become a way for
the courts simply to divest themselves of certain types of cases that
they do not want to handle, even though these cases deserve judicial
attention. Professor Carrington's article in this Symposium Issue
expresses some concern that this may already be happening!
Thus, whether this scenario holds greater benefits or greater
risks depends, in large measure, on whether courts as ADR
managers will act on the basis of sound principles or simply out of
expediency. This concern is also quite relevant to Scenario IV.
Scholars may have a significant role to play in this area, both in

6. Ronald T.Y. Moon, Visions of a New Legal System: Could There Be a Legal
System That BetterIncorporatesthe Strengths ofADR and Existing Legal Institutions?,
15 REv. LING. 475, 479-80 (1996).
7. Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981); Judith
Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982).
8. Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute
Resolution, 15 REV. LrnG. 485, 495 (1996).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
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helping the courts to develop principled bases for ADR utilization

and in evaluating the courts' efforts to employ them.10
III. Scenario II: The Courts Bring ADR Features into Court
Procedure
Over the years, commentators have made many proposals for
reform of the civil court system. Some of the most notable include
the following: shifting from a largely adversarial system to a more

inquisitorial or colloquial procedural model involving a more activist
judicial role (along the lines of European civil procedure),11

simplification of substantive law rules,12 reduction of the number
of appeals from lower court decisions,' 3 and simplification of
procedure.

14

10. See Bush, supra note 4, at 901-04 (integrating the insights of scholars to
develop principles that will assist in the selection of a forum appropriate to the nature
of a given dispute); John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not
Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 DENV. U. L. REv.
499, 500 (1989) (analyzing leading scholars' methods of empirical research regarding
the effectiveness of various ADR techniques).
11. See Adolph Homberger, Functionsof Orality inAustrian and American Civil
Procedure, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 9, 24-25 (1970) (discussing the Austrian model of "trial
by colloquy" which involves a high degree of court participation in framing litigation
and assembling proof); John Langbein, The GermanAdvantage in Civil Procedure,52
U. CHi. L. REv. 823, 854-55 (1985) (encouraging the employment of managerial
judging specifically in the fact-finding process).
12. See Guido Calabresi, Access to Justice and Substantive Law Reform: Legal
Aid for the Lower Middle Class, in 3 Accss TO JUsTICE 171 (Mauro Cappelletti &
Bryant Garth eds., 1979) (explaining reforms directed at substantive law simplification
and the effects of choosing to use bright-line rules or flexible rules); Maurice
Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote Justice That Is Civilized,
69 MICH. L. REv. 797, 813-16 (1971) (discussing nonadversarial and nonlitigious
methods for resolving certain disputes).
13. Judith Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 605-06 (1985)
(discussing methods by which judges can decide which cases warrant appeal).
14. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater- The Prospects for
ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 813-14 (1993) (discussing possible
solutions for simplifying procedure, such as ADR, and advocating more judicial
control); Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation
Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1914-19 (1993) (proposing
a model that includes litigation stages that resemble ADR processes and not traditional
courtroom proceedings).
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Interestingly, many of the features sought by these reforms are
already found in ADR processes. Arbitration, for example, typically
involves a more inquisitorial and activist third party, simplified rules
of procedure and decision, and limitation of appeals.15 Mediation
and arbitration both permit greater direct participation by parties in
the process, and both provide a less adversarial forum. 16 This
parallel between ADR features and procedural reform proposals
suggests a second scenario of the future: The popularity of these and
other features of ADR with disputants, as proven by experience with
ADR, may lead to a more favorable view of proposals to incorporate
such features into the courts' own procedures. Indeed, some suggest
that court rules and practices have already begun to do this in some
degree.17 Adoption of rules mandating settlement conferences, and
judicial practice in such conferences-and on other occasions,
(including encouraging the parties themselves to attend and act
directly to mediate settlement discussions, for example)-have
already brought ADR features into the courtroom, if not into trials
per se. Chief Justice Moon's article notes these effects in his state
and others. 8
Moreover, the use of ADR has shown that the public places
great value on certain kinds of process features. Many party
satisfaction studies show that, because of the features mentioned
above, ADR processes rate higher than court procedures. 9 This
preference may well persuade judges and court reformers to bring
more of the same kinds of features into courtroom procedure itself
in order to provide greater consumer satisfaction to litigants.
In this vision of the future, the character of our formal legal
procedure itself changes, in response to the demonstrated appeal of
process features used in ADR. The changes in courtroom procedure
might incorporate many of the elements suggested in the past by

15. See generally Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 846 (1961)..
16. Bush, supra note 4, at 991-94.
17. See Moon, supra note 6, at 481-83; Parker & Hagin, supra note 14, at 190506.
18. Moon, supra note 6, at 477-80.
19. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in
Mediation, 1987 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 372 (discussing disputants' preferences for
ADR processes over traditional court procedures). See generally ALLAN E. LIND &
TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTIcE (1988).
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reformers, as noted above.2" Such changes in legal procedure
might mean that we move toward a less differentiated dispute
resolution system overall. Of course, there would still be distinctions among the processes, but all of them-court proceedings,
arbitration, and mediation-would share some similarity of character,
rather than being so sharply different from one another. The
common character of processes in the dispute resolution system
would be less formal, less adversarial, less complex, and more
participatory than that of our current courtroom procedure.
Just as this vision imagines a shift in the character of court
procedures toward ADR features, it also foresees the opposite-ADR
processes might shift toward greater formality and legality. To some
extent, this tendency is already visible. In certain areas, for
example, arbitration is growing increasingly formal and rule bound,
and rights of appeal are expanding.21 In other areas, mediation is
being linked to arbitration in the "med-arb" process, in order to
provide greater decisional finality.' One could read these developments as suggesting that arbitration is becoming more like adjudication, and mediation more like arbitration, as the processes converge.
In effect, the vision here is one of merger-ADR and court
procedures move toward one another and blend into a more
integrated system. Perhaps this is not a surprising development in
our society, where the merger of two large and successful concerns
is a common response to competitive struggle. If this scenario were
to develop, it could also mean less attention by the courts to
screening and channelling cases to different processes as envisioned
in Scenario I because the differences between the processes themselves would not be so marked and categorical. Therefore, the
courts' management role might be different. While sometimes
channelling cases to specific processes, the courts in this scenario

20. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
21. See, e.g., William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Securities
Arbitration:A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REv. 1223, 1228-35 (1993)
(surveying the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the availability of arbitration
for claims under the Securities and Exchange Acts); David A. Lipton, Mandatory
SecuritiesIndustry Arbitration:The Problems and the Solution, 48 MD. L. REv. 881,
882-84 (1989) (criticizing recent decisions upholding mandatory arbitration agreements).
22. See, e.g., Dean G. Pruitt et al., Process of Mediation in Dispute Settlement
Centers, in MEDIATION RESEARCH 368, 370 (Kressel, Pruitt & Associates eds., 1989).
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might devote more attention to supervising a uniform, sequenced
process in which most cases move through a standard series of steps
as needed-for example, from mediation, to nonbinding arbitration,
to adjudication.'
As is evident from the comments in Chief Justice Moon's and
Professor Carrington's articles, this possible future will probably
seem problematic to many, especially those who see unique value in
the features of the adversary system of civil procedure. 4 The
concern is that the courts' ability to define and protect rights would
be seriously compromised if adversary procedures were modified.
Since this concern is deeply held by both the bench and the bar, it
might appear unlikely that this scenario would develop at all,
because the courts would never allow it. However, critiques of
adversary procedure have also been quite persistent, and it is
possible that the influence of ADR may give those critiques more
Public satisfaction
salience, even among judges and lawyers.'
concern within the
a
major
to
be
continues
system
with the justice
court system, and the ability to produce such satisfaction, by
borrowing features from ADR processes, is something that many
within the court system are likely to value highly. Therefore,
Scenario II qualifies as a possible vision of the future.

IV. Scenario Ill: The Courts Become More Purely Adjudicative
A third picture of the possible future of the court system
contrasts sharply with that just drawn in Scenario II. Some
observers argue that if our experience with ADR has taught us
anything, it is that every dispute resolution process has its strengths
and limits. Asking any process to be all things to all people is
23. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication,Dispute Resolution
and Ideology:An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 19 (1989)
(exploring the integration of adjudicative and ADR decisionmaking processes).

24. Carrington, supra note 8, at 497-501; Moon, supra note 6, at 481-83.
25. See, e.g., G.L. Davies & J.S. Leibhoff, Reforming the Civil Litigation
System: Streamlining the AdversarialFramework, 25 QUEENSL. L. SOC'Y J. 111, 11315, 121 (1995) (arguing that using ADR and modifying adversary procedure is
necessary to ensure existing system does not become irrelevant to civil dispute
resolution); Franklin P. Strier, Major ProblemsEndemic to the Adversary System and
Proposed Reforms, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 465 (1992) (discussing remedying
attorney domination by giving judges more control).
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futile. For example, mediation in divorce cases can avoid enmity
and promote harmony, but it cannot simultaneously guarantee
protection of legal rights. Conversely, adjudication of job discrimination cases protects legal rights, but it cannot simultaneously foster
cooperative work relationships.
Furthermore, measures that would modify ADR processes in an
effort to avoid the downside of ADR procedures-such as requiring
mediators to advise parties of their legal rights, or requiring
arbitrators to apply substantive legal rules-are an exercise in
futility. The very modification that cures the problem simultaneously destroys the benefit that made the ADR process attractive to
begin with. Formalizing arbitration vitiates the advantages of speed,
economy, and finality. Giving mediators protective obligations
makes it impossible for them to serve as effective facilitators of
parties' settlement efforts.2 6

The lesson learned from using ADR processes, in short, is that
each process can provide certain benefits, but only when left
relatively pure in form, and not modified to incorporate the features
of other processes. As applied to court procedure, this lesson cuts
in the opposite direction from the suggestions made in Scenario II.
Instead of seeing ADR features as valuable models for the courts, it
suggests that if courts incorporate ADR-like features, they will wind
up being less effective at doing that which only courts can do, and
which is crucial in many cases: protecting rights and articulating
norms. Thus, the ADR experience itself teaches us to keep courts,
like all dispute resolution processes, pure in their character-in this
case, the character of adjudicators of legal rights.
It is this view of the value of existing, adversary court procedure, and the need to preserve it pure and unmodified, that both
Justice Moon and Professor Carrington express in their articles.27

26. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 253, 260-61 (1989) (noting that safeguarding procedural and substantive legal
rights is in conflict with the efficiency value of settlements and that both are in conflict
with fostering party self-determination and mutual respect).
27. Carrington, supra note 8, at 497-501; Moon, supra note 6, at 481-84.
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Many others clearly share their views."8 The point to be made here
is that the ADR movement may actually support this view, rather
than work against it, as foreseen in the merger vision of Scenario
11.29 Thus, depending on how we read the lessons learned in using
ADR, they might contribute to the development of either of the very
different futures described in Scenarios 11 and II.
If the lessons of ADR are read according to Scenario III, what
might the future court system look like? There are a few different
possibilities. First, Scenario IlI might merge with the managerial
vision of Scenario I. Thus, a concern for preserving adversary
procedure might itself motivate courts to get involved in process
management. For example, courts might be more apt to channel
certain cases that seem unsuited for adversary procedure to other
processes of different character. However, the impact on the courts
emphasized in Scenario III also suggests a quite different course of
development. Scenario I imagines the ADR phenomenon leading the
courts to appreciate the value of nonjudicial mechanisms, and thus
to expand their process management functions. Scenario Ill, by
contrast, envisions the ADR phenomenon leading the courts to value
even more strongly the purity of the adjudication function itself-and
thus to resist proposals to water down judicial procedure, irrespective of court involvement in process management.
Therefore, there is a second possibility inherent in Scenario III:
Exposure to ADR might convince courts that their unique and most
valuable function is judging and that they should therefore concentrate their limited resources on that function and resist both the move
to deformalize adjudication and the move to transform courts into
process managers. In this vision, the courts would choose to limit
their functional domain, but strengthen operations within it, declining
to become process managers altogether. ADR would be left to
develop, in effect, independently of the courts, whether under the
auspices of another governmental agency or through private

28. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1088-89
(1984) (arguing that settlement and ADR are not acceptable substitutes for adjudication); Resnik, supra note 7, at 380 (criticizing the increasingly managerial role of
judges); Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.

L. REv. 494, 544-46 (1986) (arguing that traditional adjudicatory procedure, while
needing reform, is still preferable to managerial judging).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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arrangements. The courts, however, would assert (and defend) their
jurisdiction-and exercise their core function-whenever parties
sought to protect their legal rights in the adjudication process. Some
of the strongest academic critics of ADR have at least implicitly
argued for this vision of the future." What is ironic, as noted
above, is that the ADR experience itself may lead to it.
Looking beyond the courts, in the future imagined in Scenario
Ill, the principle of "process purity" would apply to ADR processes
as well. Like adjudication, arbitration and mediation would be
preserved in their strong forms and not watered down by formalization and the like. Thus, in this vision, the experience with ADR
leads to an overall system that is more differentiated, not less so.
Judges judge, mediators mediate, arbitrators arbitrate. Cases go, or

are assigned, to whichever process best meets the primary needs of
that type of case. The result may not be perfect satisfaction, but
everyone realizes that perfection is not attainable. And, over time,
each process becomes more expert and effective at producing the
results that its particular, differentiated features enable it to uniquely
produce.
Interestingly, this scenario corresponds fairly closely to the
vision of the future that runs through the work of one of the truly
seminal figures in ADR scholarship-Professor Lon Fuller. In a
series of articles, Fuller implied that each dispute resolution process
has its own unique form and its own jurisdiction and argued against
watering down or mixing the different forms of dispute resolution.31 It is not clear what he thought about the idea of courts
serving as the managers of an overall system utilizing all the forms,
but he might well have considered the managerial function better
served by an independent entity.

30. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 28, at 1084 (defending the use of adjudication to
resolve disputes); Resnik, supra note 28, at 546 (criticizing managerial judging and
stating it redefines our standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial
adjudication).
31. See Lon A. Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 356 (1978) (criticizing the modern notion that pure adjudication cannot exist);
Lon A. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 312
(1979) (listing characteristics of a model situation for mediation).

19961

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

467

V. Scenario IV: The Courts Divest Cases to Bureaucratic Entities
Another lesson learned from the experience with ADR is to
think broadly about what a dispute resolution process might look
like. It need not be a process where two individual parties meet to
argue, or even discuss, their claims or problems. Disputes can also
be resolved by establishing entities or offices that mediate-in a
different sense-between classes or groups of parties, and transfer
resources from one party to the other by some bureaucratic process.
The obvious example is a claims compensation system, funded by
levies on some class of contributors, which then distributes the funds
32
to some class of qualified claimants.
However, ADR experience has shown us that such systems need
not be permanent institutions; they can also be processes set up to
deal with discrete disputes, or bundles of disputes, such as the
Asbestos Claims Facility.33 In class action situations, this type of
process has become increasingly appealing. In fact, court procedures in some of these cases have begun to look like claims
compensation systems. This development has been troubling to
many observers and judges.34
Therefore, imagining a fourth
scenario of the future, the ADR experience may reinforce the courts'
impulse to divest themselves of cases which seem more suited to
administrative claims-handling systems.
In this vision, the courts decide to shrink their domain, by
divesting themselves of mass-claims cases. This divestment might
be achieved in a number of ways: by court orders directing that
these cases be resolved under a claims compensation system, like the
one described above; by courts pressuring legislatures to establish
appropriate agencies; or, as suggested by Professor Carrington in his
article, by courts endorsing (or engineering) class action settlements

32. See Bush, supra note 4, at 976-77.
33. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma ofthe Mass Tort ClassAction,
95 CoLuM. L. REv. 1343, 1387-89 (1995) (describing the Asbestos Claims Facility
as "an industry-wide consortium" dedicated to the "expeditious resolution[] of claims
in order to avoid the expense of litigation").
34. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shiftfrom Individual
to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473,
1503 (1986) (noting hostility among courts and commentators to the shift from

individual to group responsibility).
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that transform the settlement process itself into a kind of privately
35
managed claims-handling device.
Regardless of the specifics, the point of this scenario is that the
ADR experience might persuade the courts that mass-claims cases
belong elsewhere. Indeed, this impulse for divestment might extend
to other kinds of cases as well. And whether the alternative forum
is court ordered, party designed, or legislatively sponsored, it is
likely to have a bureaucratic character very different from that of the
traditional adjudicative process.
In one sense, Scenario IV is a special case of Scenario I, in
which the ADR experience inspires the channelling of a certain type
of case to a certain process. However, Scenario IV suggests a
somewhat different view of the possible impact of ADR on the
courts. The emphasis of Scenario I was how the ADR movement
might lead courts to invest effort and resources in the process
management function itself, as a systematic, positive endeavor. In
Scenario IV's vision, by contrast, the experience with ADR leads
courts not to a systematic commitment to process management, but
rather to specific decisions that take advantage of (or create)
opportunities for courts to divest themselves of certain groups of
cases. In Scenario IV, the courts do not adopt a new administrative
function; rather, they refrain from exercising their core adjudicative
function because they decide other processes are more appropriate.
As noted above regarding Scenario I, this divestment scenario
may be viewed as positive or negative, depending on one's assumptions about the quality of the courts' rationales for divestment.36
Principled and well-reasoned divestment, like principled process
management, offers significant benefits both to the courts and to
private parties. Unprincipled divestment, like unprincipled process
management, poses serious risks.
In his article, Professor
Carrington describes examples of both possibilities."
As noted in the discussion of Scenario I, the countervailing
potentials for both benefit and harm suggest the need for the courts

35. Carrington, supra note 8, at 498-99.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.

37. Carrington, supra note 8, at 490-92 (advancing a positive view of the A.H.
Robbins claim procedure and a critique of several industry-wide arbitration programs).
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to develop sound principles for deciding when divestment makes
sense and when it does not."

VI. Scenario V: The Courts Encounter the World of Private
Ordering
Some observers of ADR have suggested, in various ways, that

ADR represents more than just an alternative to litigation. Rather,
the suggestion is that ADR is a manifestation of a widespread
impulse by citizens to reclaim responsibility (and power) for
ordering their own affairs, rather than depending on, and being

subject to, public authorities for such ordering.

The "private

ordering" theory takes the view that ADR is part of a larger social

phenomenon.39 In the ADR movement, as part of this phenomenon, the point is to obviate, as much as possible, the need for resort
to public, governmental authority. In other words, ADR need not
and should not be court centered; it should be created and chosen by
disputants themselves as their own, independent means of ordering
their affairs. 4°

Whether or not current ADR activities and practices really
represent this kind of self-reliant and self-determined private

ordering is debatable. What is much less debatable is that this
philosophy of ADR is often expressed and supported. 4' The

38. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
39. See Peter Adler, The Future ofAlternativeDispute Resolution: Reflections on
ADR as a Social Movement, in THE PossBiLTY OF POPULAR JUsTICE 67 (Sally E.
Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993); Peter Adler et al., The Ideologies of Mediation:
The Movement's Own Story, 10 LAW & POL'Y 317, 333 (1988).
40. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE
IMPASSE: CONSENSUS APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 13 (1987)
(examining the best methods for approaching ADR in various situations); Raymond
Shonholtz, NeighborhoodJustice Systems: Work, Structure and GuidingPrinciples, 5
MEDIATION Q. 3, 18-24 (1984) (discussing Community Boards Program, a
neighborhood-based justice system).
These authors, as well as others, connect the use of ADR processes with the
public participation and democracy movement that has grown both within and beyond
the United States in recent years. Shonholtz, supra, at 9; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK,
supra, at 13.
41. See Adler, supra note 39; Adler et al., supra note 39, at 317; Shonholtz,
supranote 40; Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 40, at 246-47.
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question can be asked: What will be the effect on the courts if this
philosophy of ADR penetrates and has practical impact?
Consider the following. One of the major areas of activity in
the ADR field has been training and involving school-age children
(beginning in elementary grades) in mediation and dispute resolution
programs.42 Thousands of children have been taught in such school
programs that disputes can and should be resolved through negotiation and mediation, and these children have had experience with
actually participating in these processes. The same thing is occurring with students on many college campuses.43 And through
community mediation centers in hundreds of cities, many thousands
more are trained as volunteer mediators.'
Meanwhile, future
lawyers learn about the benefits of ADR in almost every law school
today; and in skills courses, many law students learn mediation and
dispute resolution skills, rather than adversarial advocacy skills.45
What significance will this educational phenomenon have for the
court system of the future? As these numbers grow, and as the
students of today grow to adulthood, will their exposure to ADR
practices and ideals lead them to view adversarial legal procedures
as unsatisfactory? Will they demand that legal procedures become
more informal and less adversarial? Will they consciously eschew
using legal procedures to a greater degree than disputants today?
Will the positive experiences of large numbers of disputants with
actual ADR utilization, over several decades, have similar effects on
their preferences in dispute resolution?
This vision may seem farfetched. But there are societies in
which resort to formal legal procedures is uncommon, not because
it is difficult, but because it is seen as inappropriate and counterpro-

42. See EDUCATION AND MEDIATION: ExPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES (Prudence
B. Kestner et al. eds., 1988); David Singer, Teaching Alternative Dispute Resolution
to America's School Children, 46 ARB. J. 33, 33 (1991).
43. See Cindy Fazzi, Today's School Days: Readin', Writin'"and ADR, 49 DISP.
RESOL. 73, 74 (1994).
44. See LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DIsPuTEs 111-24 (1990).
45. See Janet Weinstein, Teaching Mediationin Law Schools: Teaching Lawyers
to Be Wise, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 199, 199 (1990); Fazzi, supra note 43, at 73.
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ductive.4 6 Indeed, some maintain that our own society is not all
that different despite our alleged "litigiousness. 4 7 In any event,
it is at least worth considering that one effect of ADR, as it becomes
more of a core element of public education and civic experience,
might be that people come to accept the view that formal legal action
is not only difficult and unproductive, but even somehow improperand that private dispute resolution is not only easier and more
satisfying, but also somehow virtuous and praiseworthy.
What might be the response of the legal system itself to this kind
of development? Perhaps it would be cheered as bringing welcome
relief from the perceived overburdening of, and over-reliance on, the
legal system. On the other hand, it might be viewed as a dangerous
prelude to a balkanization of our highly pluralistic society, which
requires common and public norms to retain its coherence, not
private ordering.
The second view is reflected in Professor
Carrington's comments about the effects ADR may have in diminishing the role of law itself-and the public, social interests it represents-in our society.4" Of course, he is by no means alone in
expressing such concerns.49
It is interesting to observe that concerns like these arise in
relation to many of the scenarios. If Scenario I develops, the
concern is that process management may, intentionally or unintentionally, deny certain claimants the protection of legal rules and
procedures. If Scenario II develops, the fear is that watered-down
legal procedures will be insufficient to protect legal rights even for
those who do get into court. If Scenario IV develops, divestiture of
46. See LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A
ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 181 (1990) (concluding that the Riconeros, a NativeAmerican tribe in Mexico, prefer autonomy and flexibility of internal village
resolution as opposed to the local district court).
47. See William L. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 631, 652 (1981)
(noting that "Americans are slow to perceive injury" due to the "individualism
celebrated by American culture"); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (andThink We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5 (1983) (noting that "only
a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; only a small portion of these
become lawsuits").
48. Carrington, supra note 8,at 488-89.
49. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 28, at 1085-89 (arguing that adjudication of
disputes is needed to maintain public values and determine important social values).
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certain types of cases may, like Scenario I, serve to undermine the
development and application of legal rules. And, in Scenario V,
private ordering may put matters of crucial public interest into
private hands unconcerned with social consequences.
This recurring image of the risks arising from ADR's possible
impacts on the courts, across several visions of the possible future,
should certainly not be ignored. Wisdom lies, according to a
traditional saying, in foreseeing the possible consequences of one's
actions. The risks that are foreseeable in the scenarios sketched here
are too significant to dismiss. At the same time, consciousness of
risk should not blind us to the potential for good, or keep us from
pursuing it, though with appropriate caution.
VII.

Enlightened Dispute Resolution for the Future: Can ADR
Qualify?

The vision of Scenario V, as noted above, raises questions about
the effect of ADR, as a form of private ordering, on the glue that
holds our public life, our society, together: the law. These questions
relate to Professor Carrington's comments about the effects of ADR
in diminishing the role of law and about the significance of law and
legal procedure as "enlightened" dispute resolution. 0 For Professor Carrington, enlightened dispute resolution assigns a central role
to reason, through "the application of rational inference from undisputed reality"51 and "concern for accurate application of law to
fact." 52 Insofar as ADR diminishes the role of law, and thus the
role of reason, he suggests, it resembles premodern ritual procedures
rather than enlightened dispute resolution.53 It is very likely this
perspective that leads him, and others, to focus so heavily on the
risks ADR poses, no matter which alternative future we envision.
However, there is another perspective that might be used to look
into the future. The view that law and legal procedures are the glue
that binds society together, and that they are the paradigmatic
instruments of reason, and therefore enlightened, is a familiar point

50.
51.
52.
53.

Carrington, supra note 8, at 486-89.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
Id.
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of view.54 Nevertheless, it is not the only possible view of law,
society, reason, or enlightenment. It is possible to conceive of a
kind of social glue, and a kind of reason, quite different from those
embodied in the legal process.
Imagine the effects of social processes that, in situations of
conflict, involve citizens directly in engaging one another in
discussion, presenting their interests and perspectives to each other,
clarifying their commonalities and differences, and exploring the
possibilities for constructing a common order that interrelates their
needs and outlooks in the situation at hand. Such processes in
themselves, by their very operation, constitute a glue that can bind
citizens together in a common society. Indeed, this binding power
may be greater than that of the law. Moreover, such processes
allow, even require, consideration of facts through a type of
exchange that communicates not only empirical information but also
interpretive perspective; and they allow for a use of norms which is
accommodative rather than binary, pluralist rather than
singularist 55 Such fact and norm consideration certainly constitutes
a kind of reason. Indeed, this kind of reason may be seen by some
as deeper and richer than that commonly employed in legal procedures.
The point, of course, is that ADR processes like arbitration and
mediation are-or at least can be-the kind of processes just
described. They are social processes for dispute resolution that can,
by nature of their mode of operation, employ a very rich form of
reason and supply a very strong form of social glue. To suggest that
ADR, by definition, cannot qualify as enlightened dispute resolution
ignores this view of reason and social cohesion. It also ignores
some important parts of what we have learned about ADR processes.

54. See Owen M. Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundations of Adjudication, 6
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 127-28 (1982) (arguing that the judicial function of
interpreting and articulating legal norms is a crucial means of translating public values
into social reality); Resnik, supra note 28, at 502 (discussing Charles Clark's view
that lawyers are important contributors to the public welfare).
55. The reference here is to a distinction made by Professor Melvin Eisenberg
in clarifying that nonadjudicative processes do indeed utilize norms, though in
different ways than the legal process. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637,
638-39 (1976).
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I therefore respectfully disagree with the suggestion that only legal
procedures qualify as enlightened dispute resolution.
This is not to say that I disagree with all of the concerns about
ADR mentioned in this Article and in the other articles in this
Symposium Issue. On the contrary, I believe that many of these
specific concerns are well warranted. Indeed, my characterization
of ADR processes, in the preceding paragraph, stresses that they
have the potential to be socially cohesive and richly reasonable. I
recognize, however, that this potential is frequently unfulfilled in
actual practice; and when this is the case, the kinds of concerns that
Professor Carrington expresses-about some forms of court-ordered
mediation, for example-are well justified. 6 Nevertheless, while
the failure of ADR practice to fulfill its potential shows that greater
care and effort are needed, it does not prove that the potential is not
there. The conclusion that follows is not to severely restrict or
abandon the use of ADR, as some would do, but rather to be more
demanding about the quality of practice whenever ADR is used.
Translating ADR's potential for enlightened dispute resolution
into practice is no small task. Elsewhere, I have written at length
about the steps I believe are needed to do this with one ADR
process, mediation.57 If that potential is captured, then the future
could be bright under any of the scenarios described in this Article,
or still others that might be imagined. On the other hand, if ADR
in practice ignores or loses that potential, the forecast for the future
may be quite different. With the dispute resolution system as with
government, the quality of result will probably be proportional to the
effort we make to secure it. Or, to paraphrase the political nostrum,
the future we get will be the one we deserve. Envisioning the future
should, therefore, spur us to greater effort in the present.

56. Carrington, supra note 8, at 493-95. I have explored similar concerns, in
relation to the mediation process specifically, in much of my own work. For the most
recent and extensive of these efforts, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH

EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 55-116 (1994) (describing the problems of the
settlement-driven approach to mediation used widely in current practice, and
suggesting an alternative approach).
57. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 56, at 261-71.

